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ABSTRACT 
Across many industries, systems are exceeding their 
intended design lives, whether they are ships, bridges or 
military aircraft. As a result failure rates can increase and 
unanticipated wear or failure conditions can arise. Health 
monitoring research and application has the potential to 
more safely lengthen the service life of a range of systems 
through utilization of sensor data and knowledge of failure 
mechanisms to predict component life remaining. A further 
benefit of health monitoring when combined across an 
entire platform is system health management. System health 
management is an enabler of condition based maintenance, 
which allows repair or replacement based on material 
condition, not a set time. Replacement of components based 
on condition can enable cost savings through fewer parts 
being used and the associated maintenance costs. The goal 
of this research is to show the management of system health 
can provide savings in maintenance and logistics cost while 
increasing vehicle availability through the approach of 
condition based maintenance. 
This work examines the impact of prediction accuracy 
uncertainty in remaining useful life prognostics for a 
squadron of 12 aircraft. The uncertainty in this research is 
introduced in the system through an uncertainty factor 
applied to the useful life prediction. An ARENA discrete 
event simulation is utilized to explore the effect of 
prediction error on availability, reliability, and maintenance 
and logistics processes. Aircraft are processed through 
preflight, flight, and post-flight operations, as well as 
maintenance and logistics activities. A baseline case with 
traditional time driven maintenance is performed for 
comparison to the condition based maintenance approach of 
this research.  
This research does not consider cost or decision making 
processes, instead focusing on utilization parameters of both 
aircraft and manpower. The occurrence and impact of false 
alarms on system performance is examined. The results 
show the potential availability, reliability, and maintenance 
benefits of a health monitoring system and explore the 
diagnostic uncertainty. 
1. BACKGROUND 
Across military and commercial fleets, aircraft are an 
example where lengthening service lives and budget 
constraints can adversely affect safety. As a result, more 
frequent inspections are required as service life increases to 
ensure safety of the users and the environment. However, 
the cost of large scale modifications or replacement in the 
case of hundreds of aircraft is a significant hurdle to 
overcome in most instances (Shoup, Donohue, & Lang, 
2011). The impact of shrinking budgets can also reduce 
inspection frequency or delay needed repairs in favor of 
only performing mission critical tasks (Roach, 2009). 
Maintenance strategies must change to meet the extended 
in-service requirements and the constraints imposed by 
shrinking government and industry budgets.  
Condition based maintenance (CBM) is an evolving 
maintenance concept with a goal of reducing maintenance 
and thus life cycle costs while increasing operational 
availability made possible, in part, by leveraging health 
monitoring techniques. Department of Defense Instruction 
(DoDI) 4151.22 defines CBM as “the application and 
integration of appropriate processes, technologies, and 
knowledge-based capabilities to achieve the target 
availability, reliability, and operation and support costs of 
DoD systems and components across their life cycle,” 
(Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), May 2008, p. 1-1). 
Integrated system health management and its impact on 
performance, cost, supply chain as well as traditional 
maintenance inspections and practices are the focus of this 
research. With the F-35 maintenance and logistics alone 
projected to cost $1.1 trillion over the 55 year life span amid 
shrinking defense budgets, the need to reduce the life cycle 
cost (LCC) of military aircraft is paramount (Shalal-Esa, 
2013). Additionally, legacy aircraft may not be fitted with 
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the proper sensors to fully implement health assessment 
leading to costly inspections, in both time and maintenance 
dollars. This reduces operational availability (Ao) and the 
funds available for other needs.  
CBM is a demand driven maintenance process based on 
indications of stresses or impending failure of a component 
or system. When appropriately applied, CBM has the 
potential to reduce lifecycle cost and increase mission 
reliability by eliminating unnecessary maintenance actions 
(Butcher, 2000). Ellis (2008) argues that cost-effective 
systems monitoring allows repair actions based on system 
condition rather than costly time-based maintenance. 
Additionally, maintenance may be forecast for completion 
that minimizes impact on the operational mission of the 
system. Secondary failures, where one component’s failure 
causes adverse performance or accelerated degradation of 
interrelated components, may also be reduced by 
implementing CBM as a result of prompt repair or 
replacement of the primary cause of fault. 
CBM compares data collected from vehicle systems and 
their components and compares that information with a 
predetermined threshold prior to failure, or to failure for 
some non-critical components, then dictates repairs or 
replacement of parts. Additionally, interim time based 
inspections required under the baseline preventive 
maintenance (PM) approach are forgone, or significantly 
reduced in frequency, in lieu of continuous analysis of the 
aircraft via the integrated systems health management 
(ISHM) system. 
CBM requires sensor or inspection data to accurately 
diagnose the condition of a component. Manual inspections 
can prove costly in terms of time to perform if the part 
requires disassembly or removal of other components to 
observe its condition. Technology exists for some, and is 
under development for other components, to determine wear 
or impending failure conditions in lieu of manual 
inspections (Glaser, Li, Wang, Ou, & Lynch, 2007; 
Speckmann, 2007). The data from these health monitoring 
sensors may then be compiled to predict remaining useful 
life. Certainty is not 100%, be it in the interpretation of data 
collected on component condition or in prediction of 
remaining life based on that sensor data. This uncertainty 
has the potential to lead to poor estimation of component 
condition, which can result in false conclusions about safety 
of flight decisions and ultimately to critical failures. 
1.1. Integrated Systems Health Management Enabler 
The benefits of ISHM are the abilities to reduce inspection 
length, defer maintenance and migrate to maintenance on 
demand with the end goal to increase operational 
availability through reduced maintenance time (Speckmann, 
2007). Applying ISHM enables CBM as opposed to 
preprogrammed periodic maintenance practices; that is, 
maintaining only when required instead of when prescribed 
by schedules, thus optimizing maintenance labor (Roach, 
2009). SHM technologies and resulting modified 
maintenance programs serve to reduce the total life-cycle 
cost of a system and increase availability. While this may 
drive increased acquisition cost of a weapon system or 
aircraft due to the inclusion of health monitoring systems, 
the goal is to offset the increase with reduced operations and 
maintenance costs over the life of the program. Published 
literature shows the savings potential of ISHM enabled 
condition based maintenance on aircraft life cycle cost:  
 40% for vehicle maintenance (Walls, Thomas, & 
Brady, 1999) 
 30% to 50% for fuselage panels (Pattabhiraman, 
Kim, & Haftka, 2010) 
 10% electrical components (Scanff et al., 2007) 
 50-80% for the Boeing 777 (Gorinevsky, Gordon, 
Beard, Kumar, & Chang, 2005).  
In general, an application project could choose to increase 
the detection capability, accepting a higher acquisition cost 
with the goal of lowering the overall system life cycle cost 
through more efficient operations and maintenance.  For a 
given detection system, however, increasing the detection 
capability (e.g., lowering a threshold) will come at the 
expense of a degraded false alarm rate; the two are 
competing objectives. Ultimately, the value of the 
prognostic system will depend on the achievable balance 
between detectability for safety concerns and acceptable 
false alarm rates to avoid unnecessary and expensive 
maintenance actions. Aircraft, or other vehicle, availability 
is linked to the balance of sensor reliability and detectability 
and the capability of the system to decrease maintenance 
duration (Hoyle, Mehr, Turner, & Chen, 2007). 
It is important to understand that uncertainty will exist in the 
diagnosis and prognosis of system health. Numerous points 
of entry exist for uncertainty to work its way into remaining 
useful life (RUL) prediction. Component performance data 
is dependent on sensor health and accuracy. It is also 
difficult to anticipate the exact conditions, load, 
environment, etc, that the vehicle or machine will undergo 
during operation or storage. Quantifying and compiling 
these uncertainties is a difficult task individually and made 
harder by potential amplifying effects on each other. 
Sankararaman and Goebel (2013) discuss factors of 
uncertainty in RUL prediction and lay out methods to 
quantify and interpret the sources. They also stress the need 
to accurately determine the uncertainty in the prediction for 
the prediction to be of use. The goal is that the probabilistic 
estimates of RUL based on real time monitoring allow 
increased time to accumulate on parts, thus increasing the 
MTBF for the ISHM aircraft and generating savings through 
fewer spares procurements or repair actions. 
Determining the effectiveness of system health monitoring 
approaches requires a method for comparison of techniques. 
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The remainder of this paper discusses modeling approaches, 
evaluation techniques and results of this research. 
2. MODELING APPROACHES 
Research into the effects of prognostics on integrated 
logistics, maintenance and aircraft systems frequently 
neglects the impact of uncertainty on HM model outcomes. 
Rebulanan utilizes a discrete event simulation to represent 
the F-35 autonomic logistic system (ALS) system with a 
health management system, LRUs, communication system, 
supply, and maintenance systems (Rebulanan, 2000). 
Rebulanan further evaluates performance with aircraft 
availability, mission capable and non-mission capable rates, 
and mission reliability. Rebulanan’s model shows 
sensitivity of the supply wait time to the detection lead time 
for an impending failure and the supply stock levels. This 
outcome is somewhat intuitive in that as the prognosis of an 
impending failure is detected earlier and with greater 
accuracy, the supply system can plan further in advance, 
ensuring parts are available when required. 
Rodrigues and Yoneyama (2012; 2013) explore the effect of 
prognostics on spare parts inventories for both repairable 
and non-repairable systems compared with conventional 
supply processes. Both studies, simulated over 15 years 
each, show cost savings for the ISHM enabled system over 
the conventional one. In their work on non-repairable items 
they discuss uncertainty in failures and their impact on 
supply policy, but they do not include the impact of 
prognostic uncertainty on maintenance operations for false 
alarm adjudication or aircraft operational availability. 
Similarly, while they do address prognostic error in 
repairable systems they focus on the impact of sparing to 
account for fleet availability without addressing false alarms 
and how they might drive costs. Both works provide an 
excellent analysis of the cost impact of sparing decisions 
based upon health monitoring information. Out of stock 
costs are difficult to quantify but do impact down time for 
supply, which is where the impact is captured in our 
research model. A limitation of the nor-repairable study is 
that only one item is investigated, leaving interactions of 
multiple components in question.  
Kählert, Giljohanan and Klingauf (2014) utilize a MATLAB 
discrete event simulation to analyze one Lufthansa A320 
component with 100% unscheduled replacement. They 
utilize process times, reliability, prognostic accuracy, and 
cost to evaluate PHM system performance. Additionally, the 
use of historic Lufthansa maintenance data provides added 
realism in the research. The research focus only extends for 
two weeks around a replacement, thus leaving out some 
potential for a false alarm condition to exist prematurely. 
One of their final conclusions is a realistic PHM system 
could save approximately 20% of annual fleet operation 
costs.  
3. MODEL DESCRIPTION 
In this research, an Arena discrete event simulation is 
utilized to represent a squadron of 12 aircraft and their 
associated mission, maintenance and supply processes over 
a 15 year duration. This model explores the impacts to this 
squadron in analyzing a model containing elements not 
addressed in the works of section 2. The authors add 
uncertainty not found in Rebulanan’s work with an 
interaction of multiple components missing from Rodriques 
and Yoneyama.  
3.1. Model Components and Architecture 
The initial component failure properties were randomly 
generated from a uniform(250,1000) distribution for parts 
A-T. These times are then utilized for component 
replacements in the model. Each aircraft is generated and 
assigned 20 components with a failure time randomly 
sampled from an exponential distribution, with mean time 
between failure (MTBF) given in Table 1, and with 
probability distribution function: 
1( ) ,  0
x
f x e for x



  . The exponential distribution 
is chosen as a representative reliability function for the 
components for simplicity in model calculations of the 
constant failure rate.  The model can readily accept another 
failure distribution with other components. 
Part MTBF (hours) 
A 502 
B 280 
C 775 
D 750 
E 763 
F 364 
G 441 
H 829 
I 769 
J 941 
K 778 
L 363 
M 272 
N 642 
O 696 
P 268 
Q 822 
R 585 
S 996 
T 842 
Table 1: Components Failure Times 
The sampled failure times are considered “truth” in terms of 
component failure times. That is, if the line replaceable unit 
(LRU) incurs more than the associated failure time in hours 
without being repaired or preemptively replaced as a result 
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of scheduled preventive maintenance, overhaul in the 
baseline case or ISHM indicated replacement in the 
prognostic case, a failure occurs. Aircraft flow through 
preflight processing and mission preparation prior to 
actually flying an assigned mission. The ISHM system 
performs a scan to determine if the aircraft is anticipated to 
have enough useful life to complete the mission. Each 
component decreases its life only during engine running 
operations: taxi, take-off, flying, landing and parking. In this 
work, it is assumed that LRUs operate until failure. These 
processes are visually depicted in Figure 1. 
After sortie completion, diagnostics are again performed 
and in the baseline case, maintenance is performed as well. 
ISHM aircraft perform post flight scan and if acceptable are 
released for next flight. Baseline aircraft are inspected and 
checked for LRU preventive maintenance time. If PM is not 
required, routine maintenance and inspections are performed 
and the aircraft released for next mission. Aircraft are then 
either parked until their next mission or turned for another 
flight. 
In the maintenance module, the number of indicated failures 
is recorded and the maintenance clock starts. A detailed 
inspection is performed for both the ISHM and baseline 
cases, though shorter for the ISHM case. False alarms are 
recorded and in the ISHM case if a false alarm threshold 
over the lifetime of the part is reached, the ISHM system 
undergoes maintenance. The model indicates a false alarm 
condition if the predicted component RUL is less than the 
“truth” remaining time minus a safety factor and the 
anticipated sortie duration. In the baseline case supply stock 
is reduced and if not in stock the aircraft is grounded until 
the part arrives. Parts are processed by supply (occurs 
simultaneously with other aircraft operations in the ISHM 
case) and transferred from supply to maintenance. Aircraft 
are maintained and LRU(s) life characteristics are resampled 
from the failure distribution(s) in Table 1. The aircraft repair 
is checked and the vehicle is routed back into the mission 
queue. In the ISHM case, if the standby time until the next 
mission is greater than the mean time to perform any 
outstanding maintenance actions, the aircraft is routed to be 
maintained so as not to impact mission operations. In the 
baseline case, unless the part is scheduled for preventive 
maintenance the condition is not known thus the need for 
repair or replacement is unanticipated and the aircraft 
continues normal mission operations. Maintenance actions 
are performed serially on each aircraft, that is, only one 
inspection or maintenance action at a time, continuing until 
all required actions are complete. This assumption likely 
over constrains maintenance personnel actions, leading to 
slightly higher maintenance delays, but is done for model 
simplicity and has the same effect on the baseline and health 
monitoring cases. It is assumed that all component 
inspection times for indicated or actual failures are 
triangularly distributed (20, 30, 45) minutes and LRU 
replacements triangularly distributed (60, 90, 240) minutes. 
These times were chosen to represent a range of repairs and 
inspections while not portraying items which may require 
multiple days to maintain. Additionally, in this research 
required personnel for maintenance actions are always 
considered available. LRUs are always replaced when they 
are serviced. 
Supplies are input into the model at an initial stock level and 
a reorder point. In both the baseline and ISHM cases, the 
stock level and reorder points are fixed for the simulation. 
Figure 1: ISHM System Architecture 
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The levels are discussed further in section 3.2. Once reorder 
point is reached, the difference between stock level and 
reorder point is ordered. Time between order and delivery is 
log-normally distributed (2,1) days for all parts. 
Additionally, a processing time upon receipt is incurred. 
If RUL is within a 10 hour safety factor from failure the 
aircraft is routed to maintenance. If RUL is within a 
prescribed lead time window, a supply check is performed 
and if parts aren’t in stock they are ordered to meet 
predicted maintenance activities. If RUL is within a defined 
maintenance window, component service can occur if the 
parts are in stock or the aircraft can continue flying missions 
if there is sufficient RUL.  
3.2. Sensor and Prognostics Process 
The ISHM routine begins by computing the remaining 
useful life (RUL) of each component. The RUL prognosis 
has two components, the diagnosis from the HM system and 
the prediction uncertainty. In this research component 
diagnostics is taken as perfect, i.e. sensor always knows 
exact health. In new components sensor diagnostics can 
have difficulty detecting the health state, thus providing data 
that may not be useful. As failure becomes more imminent, 
sensor diagnostics can provide a more exact condition 
diagnosis. The resulting determination leads to component 
RUL being predicted as: 
                                         (1) 
Where Diagnosis is the log mean and equivalent to the true 
remaining life and, uncertainty is the log standard deviation 
defined in Eq. (2). 
Uncertainty is varied in this research to determine the 
impact of uncertain prognostics on Ao and sortie rates. 
Uncertainty is calculated as: 
                                             (2) 
Where Part RUL is the previous RUL prediction for that 
part and, uncertainty factor is a design variable. 
This information is sent to the CBM module where 
maintenance predictions are performed. While no specific 
RUL prognostic technique is used, the technique above is 
utilized to represent compounded error or uncertainty built 
up in the system. Initially, RUL estimation is chiefly 
impacted by the uncertainty factor, but in section 4.2, 
additional degradation to the system is added to account for 
sensor diagnostic losses. Eqs. (1) and (2) are representative 
equations developed by the authors to portray the behavior 
of health monitoring systems. They are not intended to 
mimic the performance of a particular system, but to 
represent the functionality of a monitoring system. The 
uncertainty factor is a representation of the accumulated 
variability in the prognostics for remaining useful life. This 
work ranges the uncertainty factor from a low of 0, to 
represent perfect prognosis, to a high of 100, which 
approaches half the MTBF of some parts. Examining a 
range of variability between these end points allows system 
designers to quantify how much uncertainty is acceptable in 
a health monitoring system before selecting one for 
inclusion on an aircraft. 
The system then enters a decision node where the RUL is 
compared to a set safety factor, which would be a policy 
decision based on mission requirements. If there is RUL 
above the safety factor and the projected sortie length does 
not encroach on the safety factor, the aircraft is cleared for 
flight. If the RUL is below the safety factor, the 
component(s) are flagged and sent to maintenance. If RUL 
is sufficient, the aircraft is cleared for the next process. In 
all, the aircraft is checked prior to mission preparation 
(fuelling and cargo loading), prior to take-off, during flight, 
and upon landing. If all of these checks are satisfactory the 
aircraft continues through missions and standby time until a 
maintenance action is required. 
The CBM system preorders parts to meet demands as 
described above. If the part is not in stock, the aircraft is 
placed in a non-mission capable supply hold until the part 
arrives. Upon maintenance completion, the ISHM equipped 
aircraft bypasses additional check-outs normally performed 
to inspect work, instead relying on the ISHM system to 
perform them. The aircraft is then released for the next 
mission tasking.  
3.3. Evaluation Parameters 
Establishment of useful performance measures to evaluate 
the model is essential. To that end, metrics currently used to 
determine aircraft and system performance are preferred as 
a means of comparison. Three categories of metrics, 
although interwoven, are laid out below and are used when 
discussing the results of this research: availability; 
reliability; and maintenance. 
3.3.1. Availability 
To understand operational availability and why it is a good 
measure of system performance for this model, it is useful to 
be familiar with achieved and inherent availabilities as well.  
Inherent availability (Ai) is the availability of a system 
operating under an ideal support system. This means delays 
for logistics, administrative delays and preventive 
maintenance time are excluded, leaving only operating time 
and corrective maintenance. 
Achieved Availability (Aa) adds preventive maintenance to 
Ai in addition to corrective maintenance. Logistics, supply 
and administrative delays are ignored and those assets are 
assumed to be instantaneously available when required. 
Achieved availability is determined examining the mean 
time between maintenance, MTBM, and the mean 
maintenance time (MMT). 
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Operational availability (Ao) adds the final piece to the 
downtime portion of the equation. Ao includes logistics, 
supply and administrative delays to the PM and CM for the 
system resulting in the mean down time for the system. 
Operational availability is the system availability the user of 
a system realizes, (ReliaSoft, 2007). Mathematically, 
operational availability is: 
   
      
               
 
    
             
 (3) 
Where MLDT is the mean logistics delay time. 
Eq. (3) is not the only way to define operational availability. 
Pryor (2008) discusses methods to calculate Ao seen in Eq. 
(4) using the uptime/(uptime + downtime) definition of Eq. 
(3), but the definition is slightly different. 
   
     
                   
 (4) 
Where OT is the operational time, 
ST is the standby time, 
TPM is the total preventive maintenance time, 
TCM is the total corrective maintenance time, and  
TALDT is the total administrative and logistics delay time, 
equivalent to MLDT. 
Figure 2 shows the components of up and down times. This 
is by no means an exhaustive list and further breakdowns 
are possible, especially in the administrative and logistics 
delay blocks, but for this research these components define 
the temporal parameters. 
 
Figure 2: Components of System Usage Time (Pryor, 2008) 
A function of a system’s operational availability, average 
daily flying hours is a measurement of the ability of the 
squadron as a whole to perform the assigned missions. 
Further, the number of sorties flown per day is a function of 
the mission requirements, but also the performance of the 
aircraft as well as maintenance and logistics systems. 
3.3.2. Reliability 
In the commercial environment, up and down times can also 
be assigned costs as the systems impact revenue generation. 
Kählert, Giljohanan and Klingauf discuss dispatch 
reliability, or the “ratio of revenue departures without delay 
or cancellations compared to all flights,” (2014, p.1). They 
go on to summarize commercial aircraft cost accounting for 
delays and cancellations. Downtime has an associated cost 
beyond maintenance labor in lost revenue. Similarly, uptime 
has the potential to generate revenue, when not in a standby 
capacity. For military systems, assigning costs to up and 
downtime is problematic as there is no profit to generate and 
supporting national security is difficult to assign a value to. 
In essence, military aircraft are consumptive, always 
operating at a loss. Policy and research can, however, strive 
to reduce these consumption costs.  
False alarms diagnosed or predicted by the ISHM system 
drive unnecessary maintenance and supply actions as well 
as placing an otherwise mission capable aircraft into a NMC 
state. These maintenance and supply actions increase the 
overall cost impact of the ISHM system as they are not free. 
A key requirement for successful deployment of an ISHM 
architecture enabling CBM is a low false alarm rate with 
reliable detection (Ellis, 2008; Van Horenbeek, Van 
Ostaeyen, Duflou, & Pintelon, 2013). False alarms in the 
baseline model result from CND and RTOK discussed 
previously. Totals for each of the models will be recorded 
for comparison. Additionally, an increase in false alarms, 
above a predetermined threshold, on an aircraft with an 
ISHM system will trigger an inspection of the ISHM system 
sensors providing erroneous data and potentially of the 
ISHM system logic itself.  
The ability to tolerate false alarms is a two-fold evaluation. 
First, the cost associated with each false alarm shrinks any 
cost benefit of the ISHM system over the baseline system. 
Second, too many false alarms can trigger a “cry wolf” 
attitude towards the system or result in wasted time 
maintaining, or checking the system thus decreasing the 
operational availability of the aircraft and the reliability of 
the ISHM system. For an ISHM architecture to be effective 
it cannot trigger excessive false alarms which, in turn, 
trigger maintenance actions on the system. 
3.3.3. Maintenance and Logistics 
Inspection intervals are time driven processes under the 
baseline aircraft case and are prescribed to monitor systems 
for indications of damage. They are generally based on 
historic or predicted failure data and are conducted to ensure 
early indications of failure are discovered before they 
catastrophically fail the system or adjacent components. An 
assumption for this research is that all systems of interest on 
the aircraft are monitored in the ISHM model. If that were 
not the case time based, but informed through ISHM 
inferences, inspections would still be required. In this 
Time 
Active Time 
Uptime 
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Time 
Mission 
Time 
Operating 
Time 
Pre/Post Op 
Checks 
Maintenance 
Time 
Pre/Post 
flight 
processing 
Downtime 
Maintenance 
Time 
Corrective 
Maintenance 
Preventive 
Maintenance 
Inspection 
Administrative 
Delay Time 
Logistics 
Delay Time 
Inactive 
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research, the ISHM case only requires inspection upon 
indication of failure or impending failure by the system. 
Therefore, the inspection intervals should be further apart 
and of shorter duration for ISHM than for time based 
methods. The preprogrammed PM inspections of the 
baseline are defined based on operating hours. 
Accounting for the required time to repair and inspect 
aircraft is critical in determining the impacts of system 
changes to downtime and manpower costs. In addition to the 
repair of malfunctioning components, inspections based 
upon fault indications, either in performance or indicated by 
the ISHM system, drive mission unavailability and decrease 
system performance metrics. A common metric is to 
measure the required maintenance man hours per aircraft 
flight hour or MMH/FH. This factor can then be utilized in 
forecasting manpower requirements and required downtime 
based on mission requirements. Similarly, mean down time 
(MDT), the average amount of time it takes to return an 
aircraft to flying status once a fault is indicated, is a 
commonly used maintenance performance metric. 
Supply delay is the time between actual part need and when 
the supply system delivers the part to maintenance and will 
impact both the baseline and ISHM/CBM cases. Non-
mission capable supply (NMCS) is the common measure of 
this supply delay. The prognostic CBM case will anticipate 
failure and sparing requirements further out from 
maintenance demand and allow for advanced ordering if 
stock levels are inadequate. The current baseline process 
relies on anticipating failures and providing stock levels at 
individual bases or in some cases a central location that can 
be tasked to deliver spares when required. This process 
increases the logistic footprint by requiring storage facilities 
for materiel that may not be needed for upwards of a year. 
Managing these spares and the facility requires additional 
resources, manpower and money. “Logistics response time, 
a measure of supportability and an indirect measure of 
readiness,” (Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Logistics and Materiel Readiness, May, 2008, p.  6-4), 
drives shorter maintenance times and as such impacts 
supply and maintenance downtime. 
While maintenance policy and cost decisions impact LRU 
replacement decisions, the prognostics capability plays an 
important role in determining when to repair or exchange 
components. Confidence in the performance of the 
diagnostics and prognostics systems could lead to a 
decreasing safety factor as to when maintenance occurs. 
This resulting increase in useable time of each part saves 
money through extended service life for the components and 
reduces the amount of supplies consumed. Capturing the 
amount of useful life lost for the components can quantify 
the gains that may be achievable. 
3.4. Model Variables 
This research explores the impact of RUL prediction 
uncertainty on the availability, reliability, and maintenance 
and logistics categories above. Evaluation of the model is 
accomplished through simulation of 15 years of aircraft 
utilization. Further, two design cases are initially utilized in 
the simulations. The remaining useful life uncertainty factor 
is varied at 14 levels with two false alarm limits at 0 and 
10000 and the model assessed at each increment. The levels 
for the FA limit is meant to indicate that at 0, the ISHM 
system is always maintained after a false alarm and at 
10000, policy allows nearly unlimited false alarms by the 
ISHM system before requiring repair. These levels are 
found in . At each uncertainty factor 100 simulations are run 
to establish confidence in the results, and the means of these 
data are presented. Sensitivity to values of FA limit greater 
than 0 is presented later in this paper once sensor and 
prognostics degradation are considered. Additionally, two 
simulations of the baseline case with no prognostics are run 
where component stock levels are varied. 
Stock levels for the ISHM case are held to 1 nominally and 
ordered as predicted by the system. In the baseline case, two 
comparisons are examined, one where the stock levels are 
kept the same as the ISHM case. The other stock level case 
holds 4 parts in stock and reorders when the level drops to 
2. This variance of stock level for the baseline case makes 
the process comparable to minimal levels as in the ISHM 
case and robust levels when failure is somewhat uncertain.  
4. RESULTS 
4.1. No ISHM Degradation Results 
Daily flying hour averages for all simulation runs are 
located in . It is noted in these data that a decrease of 19.04 
flying hours per day occurs over the range of uncertainty 
factors for a FA limit of 0. This decrease is smaller when the 
FA limit is 10000, reaching 3.45 hours. This reduction 
corresponds to 6949 and 1261 hours respectively in lost 
flying each year, the equivalent of removing more than 1 
aircraft’s missions from the flight taskings in the unlimited 
case and over 5 aircraft in the 0 FA limit case. The last two 
rows in  contain performance results of the baseline model 
where the numbers in parentheses represent the stock level 
and reorder point respectively. For the baseline model, the 
(1,0) supply case yields only 18.36 daily flying hours while 
the (4,2) case achieves 27.94 hours. The chief cause of this 
difference is attributed to the (1,0) case waiting for supplies 
to be delivered as they are only ordered as needed and only 
1 item is held in stock. The ISHM cases all benefit from the 
prognostic capability of the ISHM system in ordering 
supplies to meet requirements. 
A typical measure when examining the maintenance 
demand of an aircraft is maintenance man hours per flying 
hour. Figure 3 examines MMH/FH for the case where all 
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false alarms trigger ISHM system maintenance and the case 
where FAs in the system do not incur ISHM maintenance, 
merely downtime to adjudicate the alarm does not require 
maintenance. As shown in Figure 3, the 0 FA limit case 
MMH/FH increases linearly as the uncertainty factor 
increases. This growth results from the number of 
maintenance actions on the ISHM system as every FA 
triggers ISHM maintenance. Maintaining the ISHM system 
takes more time than merely adjudicating a false alarm by 
the ISHM system thus the increase in maintenance hours. In 
the case where FAs do not trigger ISHM repair, the 
MMH/FH grow slowly reaching a maximum of 0.268 vs. 
4.198 for the 0 FA case. Inspection and maintenance times 
drive the maintenance hours and if inspection times were to 
increase significantly, the number of false alarms shown in 
Figure 4 could change the behavior of Figure 3. 
Additionally, as the uncertainty factor increases more false 
alarms occur as shown in Figure 4 as does the resulting 
downtime associated with the false alarms observed in 
Figure 5. For comparison, the baseline cases have MMH/FH 
ratios of 0.546 and 0.549 for the (1,0) and (4,2) cases 
respectively. In the baseline case, time based preventive 
maintenance occurs at set intervals versus the condition 
based method employed by CBM driving extra maintenance 
hours. 
 
 
 
ISHM False Alarm Limit 
 0 10000 
 
Uncertainty 
Factor 
Mean Daily Flying Hours 
 0 35.98 35.98 
 2 35.25 35.26 
 5 34.90 35.00 
 7 34.36 34.92 
 10 33.53 34.86 
 20 30.14 34.37 
 30 27.32 34.10 
 40 24.88 33.85 
 50 22.96 33.55 
 60 21.38 33.25 
 70 19.93 33.15 
 80 18.92 32.92 
 90 17.80 32.62 
 100 16.94 32.52 
Baseline (1,0) 18.36 
Baseline (4,2) 27.94 
Table 2: Average Daily Flying Hours 
While the MMH/FH numbers are low for an entire aircraft, 
for a system of subcomponents when scaled up it is feasible. 
For example, the U.S. Air Force C-17 fleet operates around 
6 MMH/FH (Nelms, 2008). 
 
Figure 3: Maintenance Man Hours per Flight Hour 
Figure 4 illustrates the average false alarms per aircraft per 
year. The quantity increases from 0 for the 0 uncertainty 
factor, perfect prognosis, case to 101.52 and 196.65 for the 
0 and unlimited FA cases respectively at the 100 uncertainty 
factor case. As observed in the figure, since the amount of 
time spent in maintenance repairing the ISHM system for 
every FA in the 0 limit case increases as the uncertainty 
factor increases the number of false alarms is lower. It 
should be noted that this is not a reduction in the FA rate, as 
the prognosis accuracy is not degrading over time for this 
initial investigation. This mostly results from the 
maintenance time taking away time when the aircraft could 
be flying and, as noted in , the mean daily flying hours are 
nearly double for the unlimited FA case.  
 
 Figure 4: False Alarms per Aircraft per Year 
While the number of false alarms per aircraft per year is 
nearly doubled in the 0 limit case versus the no limit case, 
FA downtime increases at a considerably higher rate. As 
shown in Figure 5, the average downtime each aircraft 
experiences per year due to FA increases from 0 for the 
perfect prognosis case to 111.31 hours for the unlimited FA 
Baseline (1,0): 0.546 
Baseline (4,2): 0.549 
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case and over 2000 hours for the FA limit 0 case. The 
increase is attributed to the additional maintenance required 
to maintain the ISHM system at the lower FA trigger. 
 
Figure 5: False Alarm Downtime per Aircraft per Year 
Compiling all components of downtime and the number of 
times the aircraft is down for maintenance leads to the mean 
down time for an occurrence. As shown in Figure 6, mean 
down time decreases from 3.24 hours when the uncertainty 
prognosis is perfect to a low 1.09 hours when the 
uncertainty factor is 100 and FA limit is unlimited. This 
decrease is attributed to the fact that while the aircraft is 
being removed from service more often to adjudicate false 
alarms as the uncertainty factor increases, the inspections do 
not take as long as the aircraft is quickly returned to 
operation. MDT for the 0 FA limit case grows as the 
uncertainty factor rises, mostly due to all components 
requiring inspection and sensor repair for each time down. 
As uncertainty rises, the aircraft is brought down more 
frequently, but more often for a false alarm than 
maintenance actions. Adjudicating a false alarm through 
inspection takes less time than a repair, thus the down time 
is smaller. For the baseline (1,0) case, MDT is 171.82 hours, 
and for the (4,2) case 17.47 hours. The MDT for the (1,0) 
case is high mainly due to NMCS as there is only a stock 
level of 1 LRU and parts are ordered on demand, not 
schedule. The other major driver for the baseline MDT is 
the PM process. 
 
Figure 6: Mean Down Time 
At the low end of the uncertainty factor range, the fixed 10 
hour safety factor imposed on each part accounts for a 
majority of the lost life each LRU, with the remainder 
mostly coming from the component not being able to safely 
cover the projected sortie duration. As the uncertainty factor 
increases, the mean life lost per component increases as well 
due to the uncertainty in the RUL prediction necessitating 
replacement before LRU failure. Additionally, the between 
mission maintenance window check forwards aircraft for 
LRU replacement or repair if the RUL prediction is within 
the designated maintenance window and parts are in stock. 
Figure 7 depicts the simulation outcome described above, 
growing from 15.63 hours to 35.40 hours for the uncertainty 
factor 100 case for each FA limit. Taken over the 15 years, 
the total life lost ranges from a low of 144506 hours for the 
perfect prognostics condition to 321236 hours for the case 
where uncertainty factor is 100 and FA limit is unlimited. 
This translates to 36.67 years of part life lost for the latter 
case. The mean life lost for each FA limit case is 
approximately equal at each point, thus they are collocated 
in the figure. This results from the fact that while the ISHM 
system may require more maintenance, the LRU 
components are only replaced as required. Of note is the 
max total life lost for the 0 FA limit case is 207901, 
occurring at an uncertainty factor of 20. The total life lost 
then continues to drop off as the uncertainty factor rises. 
This is due to the number of hours being flown by the 
aircraft declining as the uncertainty factor increases, thus 
not requiring LRU replacement as frequently. The lost 
utilization and cost implications of this figure could provide 
justification for system implementation. Component life lost 
in the baseline case is driven by the time based preventive 
maintenance (PM) cycle. In this research, the PM cycle is 
set at 400 hours whereby all components with less than 400 
hours remaining, by time accounting, are replaced, yielding 
a mean life lost of 376.49 and 377.06 hours for the (1,0) and 
(4,2) cases respectively. 
Baseline (1,0): 171.82 
Baseline (4,2): 17.47 
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Figure 7: Mean Life Lost per Component 
False alarms and maintenance hours are important when 
determining cost, support requirements, and system 
confidence, but users, whether they are military or 
commercial, want to know how often their aircraft are 
available and when tasked if they can complete the mission. 
Utilizing Eq. (6) to calculate Ao, Figure 8 shows the impact 
of uncertainty factor and FA limit. Operational availability 
drops from 0.983 for both FA limit levels at an uncertainty 
factor of 0 to 0.754 for the uncertainty factor 100, FA limit 
0 case and 0.969 for the unlimited FA case. The increase in 
downtime to repair the ISHM system in the 0 FA limit case 
is the driving factor in the decrease in Ao over the 
uncertainty levels. In the baseline cases, Ao is 0.618 and 
0.941 for the (1,0) and (4,2) cases respectively. Ao is low in 
the (1,0) case again for the NMCS condition. 
 
Figure 8: Operational Availability 
4.2. Sensor and Prognostic Degradation Results 
A further examination of the impact of a degrading 
prognostics capability is examined as well. The Eq. (2) 
becomes: 
                                            
                     
(5) 
This degradation factor places an additional uncertainty on 
the RUL prediction given as: 
                       
               
             
     (6) 
Where growth factor is either 50 or 200 to provide different 
rates of degradation. Referring to Table 1, it is shown that 
component MTBF is bounded between 250 and 1000 hours. 
Therefore, the impact on RUL uncertainty could grow to 
nearly the component life in the case of part P if left 
unchecked. The Part ISHM timer is the accumulated life on 
the ISHM components associated with a specific 
component. The timer is reset upon component replacement 
or when a false alarm limit is reached thereby initiating 
maintenance on the ISHM system. Degradation factor 
increases as a function of the accumulated time on the Part 
ISHM timer. Thus, the longer the ISHM system is in 
operation, the higher the degradation factor becomes adding 
to the uncertainty in the system. As with Eqs. (1) and (2), 
Eqs. (5) and (6) are representative equations developed by 
the authors to portray the behavior of health monitoring 
systems.  
Including the degradation factor in the model as in Eq. (5) 
shows a false alarm limit may be useful in actual aircraft 
operation. Fixing the error factor at 20, towards the lower 
end of the range, an exploration of the impact of false alarm 
limits is made. The growth factors of 50 and 200, utilized in 
Eq. (6), are hereafter referred to as high and low 
respectively. These factors correspond to a growth rate of 20 
and 5 per hundred hours of accumulated time on the ISHM 
system respectively. The degradation factor adds additional 
uncertainty to the RUL prediction to examine the effect of 
degrading sensor or prognostics capability through use of 
the aircraft. In the analysis of degradation factor, FA limit is 
the variable of change and is varied from 0 to 100. 
Examining the impact of FA limit on mean daily flying 
hours for the squadron shows that the 0 FA limit case, for 
which every false alarm triggers ISHM maintenance, 
dramatically reduces the flying hours. This results from the 
amount of maintenance required on the ISHM system 
depleting available hours to fly missions. These results are 
shown in Figure 9 and indicate that the low degradation 
growth rate reduces the flying hours from 32.67 at a FA 
limit of 2 to 31.15 at 100. In contrast, the high growth rate 
drops the daily hours from 32.16 at FA limit 2 to 27.49 at 
FA limit 100. The difference in the magnitude of the 
declines lies in the fact that the high degradation rate 
Baseline (1,0): 376.49 
Baseline (4,2): 377.06 
Baseline (1,0): 0.618 
Baseline (4,2): 0.941 
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increases uncertainty in the RUL prediction, thus driving 
false alarm occurrence up. That is, when the FA limit is 0 
and there is a false alarm, the ISHM system is always 
repaired. When the FA limit increases to 2, this allows 
flights to continue until 2 false alarms are incurred, thus 
allowing increased flying hours for the aircraft. The 
degradation factor, slow deterioration of prognostics system, 
accounts for the remaining decline in daily flying hours. 
This results from compounded error in the system 
increasing as the time between service lengthens due to the 
FA limit being raised. 
 
Figure 9: Daily Hours Flown 
Figure 3 shows that for a static uncertainty factor of 20 the 
MMH/FH was 0.165 and 0.743 for the FA limit 10000 and 
0 cases respectively. Figure 10 below shows that the high 
degradation rate reaches 0.74 at a FA limit of 100 and the 
low rate 0.378. The graph does not show the FA limit 0 
MMH/FH data of 2.361 for the low and 2.468 for the high 
to allow better visualization of the remaining data. It is 
observed in Figure 11 that the impact of the high growth 
rate greatly increases the number of false alarms, thus 
increasing the maintenance hours required per aircraft flight 
hour shown in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10: Maintenance Man Hours per Flight Hour 
As previously mentioned, Figure 11 is perhaps the best 
indicator of the impact of degradation growth rates on 
aircraft operations. The high growth rate proves true to its 
name as the rate of increase in false alarms per aircraft per 
year remains higher than the low growth rate over the range 
of FA limits. The number of false alarms increases as a 
result of the degradation factor continually increasing as the 
ISHM system is not being maintained at the shorter 
intervals a lower FA limit brings.  
 
Figure 11: False Alarms per Aircraft per Year 
The impact of the increase in false alarms, and thus 
downtime, is a decrease in operational availability, Ao, as 
the FA limit increases. Shown in Figure 12, the Ao trend 
follows that of the daily flying hours and inversely the 
trends of false alarms and MMH/FH. Operational 
availability peaks at a FA limit of 4 for both the high and 
low growth rates. The low growth rate levels off around 
0.96 at FA limit 60 while the high rate continues a decline 
to 0.93 at FA limit 100 without leveling off. 
Baseline (1,0): 0.546 
Baseline (4,2): 0.549 
Baseline (1,0): 18.36 
Baseline (4,2): 27.94 
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Figure 12: Operational Availability 
While Figure 11 shows the increased growth in number of 
false alarms, the true utility of the model is in determining 
the “sweet spot” across the performance curves. This is the 
location where a peak or trough in the curves indicates 
performance drops off on either side and thus this set of 
factors should be considered for system design. In this 
paper, examining Figure 10 and Figure 12 show a 
performance drop off at a FA limit of 4.  shows that mission 
reliability declines across all FA limits, indicating that 
keeping the FA limit as low as possible is desirable. These 
results are specific to the set of inputs used in the model. If 
the time for inspection of a failure condition or to repair the 
ISHM system were changed, the potential for a different 
outcome in FA limits exists. Therein lies the utility of the 
model in being able to change input characteristics and 
policies to determine system level performance metrics. 
In comparing the sensor degradation case in Figure 9 with 
the baseline case, daily flying hours remain higher than the 
baseline case across the FA limit range. The MMH/FH for 
the degradation case with low growth rate remains below 
that of the baseline cases, while the high growth rate case is 
higher than the baseline cases for FA limits above 40. As 
previously discussed, the FA limit “sweet spot” in this 
model is 4 thus MMH/FH would be approximately 0.3 and 
less than the baseline cases. Comparing Ao between the 
baseline and degradation models shows that around the 4 
FA limit results, the degradation cases are above 0.96 while 
the baseline cases are 0.618 and 0.941 for the (1,0) and (4,2) 
cases respectively. This again shows the ISHM system to 
provide higher performance. Finally, the mission reliability 
for the baseline cases of 84.85% is higher than the ISHM 
cases, which are below 70% at the 4 FA limit case. Across 
the model metrics the ISHM case with degradation tends 
towards higher performance than the baseline. Depending 
on the desired performance levels desired for the aircraft 
program managers are left to weigh the performance 
metrics. 
In the model case where degradation is present, for the 
uncertainty factor chosen it is generally best to set the false 
alarm limit low. Programmatic policy of cost, availability 
and reliability will drive towards the selection of a proper 
limit. Additionally, changes to degradation factor, i.e. ISHM 
sensor and prognostic characteristics, and RUL uncertainty, 
prediction algorithm accuracy, can change model outcomes. 
Cost to implement a certain health monitoring technology 
on the aircraft may outweigh the benefit of its inclusion if it 
drives too many false alarms or too much repair time. 
Absent the cost impacts of manpower and component 
replacement, the decision as to how much uncertainty in 
prognostics is an easier proposition. It is shown in the model 
with no degradation that as the RUL uncertainty increases, 
most performance characteristics are adversely impacted. 
The comparison of baseline to ISHM cases shows the 
potential advantages implementation of health monitoring 
and condition based maintenance. The test for program 
managers then becomes selecting the appropriate system 
characteristics to meet overall aircraft fleet performance and 
cost metrics. 
5. CONCLUSION 
This research shows employment of an ISHM system 
supporting CBM can produce system performance greater 
than baseline systems. The main contribution of this effort is 
as a simulation tool to compare sensing options and 
examine their impact on desired performance factors. The 
ability to input ISHM system and aircraft characteristics and 
investigate alternative approaches to monitoring and 
maintenance makes this tool useful in program decisions on 
whether or not to implement monitoring techniques. While 
determining causes of system uncertainty is outside the 
scope of this research, quantifying the impact of the 
uncertainty is demonstrated. As a system designer it is 
important to note, as this research shows, the amount of 
uncertainty in your system, particularly in the prognostics. 
This uncertainty could be mitigated with better sensors, 
techniques or processing algorithms. Further, the designer 
should seek to minimize either the number or false alarms 
the prognostic system produces or set an appropriate limit 
on false alarms to minimize the impact of additional 
inspection time to adjudicate system condition. 
As cost is not included in this work making a true 
comparison among options is difficult. A program manager 
must weigh the technology costs to achieve the performance 
observed in the model and compare those with system 
objectives. This task becomes easier if these variables can 
be explored across a range of scenarios as this research 
provides.  
Future work in this research will explore the impact of cost, 
supply factors and manpower requirements. 
 
Baseline (1,0): 0.618 
Baseline (4,2): 0.941 
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